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Judicial Responses to the EEOC's Failure To Attempt
Conciliation
Under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 1 the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or the Commission) may bring suit2 against employers3 who discriminate in
their employment practices.4 Before filing suit, the Commission
must "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."5 The Commission may sue only if it cannot obtain an acceptable conciliation agreement.6
EEOC regulations acknowledge that the Commission must attempt conciliation before bringing suit.7 The scope of the suit may
change, however, after initial conciliation talks. 8 If the EEOC adds
l. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
This Act amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241,253
(1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-16 (1976)). The Act, as amended, will be
referred to in text as Title VII.
2. If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission . . . the Commission
has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the
Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent . . . named
in the charge.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976).
3. The act prohibits discriminatory employment practices by employers, employment
agencies or labor organizations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1976).
4. The specific practices prohibited are detailed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -3 (1976).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976). An individual plaintiff may sue regardless of whether
the Commission has attempted conciliation or not. Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405
F.2d 645, 652 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969).
1. See EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D. Md. 1974), ajfd. in
part, revd. in part and remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976); see generally 29
C.F.R. § 1601.24 (1982).
8, Problems generally arise when the scope of the complaint exceeds the scope of the conciliation talks. For example, the complaint may name a party not included in conciliation.
See, e.g., EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1974)
(conciliation talks included employer but not union). The complaint may contain charges of
discrimination not discussed during conciliation. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (portion of complaint alleging sex discrimination was
dismissed where conciliation covered only race discrimination). The complaint may cover
employees not discussed during conciliation. See, e.g., EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F.
Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (granting partial summary judgment on portion of complaint
covering management, professional and technical personnel where conciliation only covered
flight attendants).
Problems can also arise when the scope of conciliation far exceeds the scope of the complaint. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (alternative holding). In the Sears cases,
. the EEOC initiated conciliation with Sears' national headquarters concerning nationwide discrimination. When conciliation failed, the EEOC filed several suits against a few specific Sears
stores. Two courts held such conciliation inadequate because these stores were given no opportunity to comply with the law voluntarily before suit. 650 F.2d at 19; 490 F. Supp. at 1255.
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new defendants or charges to the suit, prior conciliation may no
longer satisfy the statutory prerequisite.9 Courts have held that inadequate conciliation efforts or bad faith attempts 10 do not fulfill the
statutory prerequisite to suit. 11
When the EEOC fails to satisfy the statute's conciliation requirement, courts refuse to hear the merits of a case. 12 The procedural
disposition of such a case, however, varies. The statute authorizes
staying proceedings pending further conciliation, 13 and courts have
Faced with identical facts, two other courts reached different results. A federal district court in
Georgia found no fault with the conciliation efforts. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 22 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 30,768 (N.D. Ga. 1980). A suit in Illinois alleging nationwide discrimination survived a motion to dismiss because it was coextensive with the scope of conciliation.
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
9. Courts are generally reluctant to review the content of conciliation negotiations. See
EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527,533 (10th Cir. 1978) ("a court should not examine the details
of the offers and counteroffers between parties . . . ."); EEOC v. North Cent. Airlines, 475 F.
Supp. 667 (D. Minn. 1979); cf. EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Chestnut Run &
Affiliated Facilities, 373 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Del. 1974) (court refused to examine merits of
EEOC determination of reasonable cause), qffd., 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975). When a defendant claims that the Commission failed to attempt conciliation regarding particular charges
or a particular defendant, however, courts will examine the validity of that claim. See EEOC
v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678, 684 (M.D. Fla. 1978); EEOC v. Allegheny
Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
10. Even when conciliation talks included all the issues raised by the complaints, some
courts examined the history of the negotiations to determine the EEOC's good faith. See
EEOC v. Pet, Inc., Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); EEOC v. Zia
Co., 582 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978).
11. See, e.g., EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 531-32 (10th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1257-58 (M.D. Ala. 1980); EEOC v. International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341,346 (D. Mass. 1979); EEOC v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 452
F. Supp. 678, 682-84 (M.D. Fla. 1978); EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300, 130507 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
Since most failures to fulfill the conciliation requirement arise from partial conciliation,
this Note will refer only to "inadequate conciliation." This term includes bad faith attempts to
conciliate as well as complete failure to attempt conciliation. The term also includes situations
in which the EEOC in good faith, but mistakenly, believes that the concilation requirement
has been satisfied.
12. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Klingler
Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); EEOC v. Magnolia Elec. Power Assn.,
635 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Pet, Inc., Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.
1980) (per curiam); EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978); Patterson v. American
Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (alternative holding); EEOC v. International
Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1979); EEOC v. Sherwood Medical fodus.,
452 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Fla. 1978); EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla.
1978); EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977); EEOC v. Brown
Transp. Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1976); EEOC v. National Cash
Register Co., 405 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ga. 1975); EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F.
Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1974), qffd in part, revd in part and remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d
590 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala.
1974); EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974).
13. The statute explicitly allows the court "in its discretion [to] stay further proceedings for
not more than sixty days pending . . . further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary
compliance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976).
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identified circumstances under which they will grant a stay. 14 The
statute does not state what a court must do where a stay is inappropriate.15 Thus, courts have, in their discretion, disposed of suits by
either dismissal of the complaint 16 or summary judgment for the
defendant. 17
Dismissal and summary judgment evoke different consequences.18 As a decision on the merits, 19 summary judgment has res
judicata effect and bars any subsequent action by the EEOC based
upon the same charge.20 Dismissal, on the other hand, is generally
14. See EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); EEOC v.
Pet, Inc., Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); EEOC v. Zia Co., 582
F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. Canadian Indem. Co., 407 F. Supp. 1366 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
Typically, courts stay proceedings when the parties seem close to agreement, as in Canadian
Indemnity, or when the EEOC clearly attempted conciliation, but EEOC bad faith caused the
negotiations to fail, as in Pet and Zia. Where the EEOC fails to attempt conciliation, courts
generally refuse to exercise their discretion to stay proceedings. E.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1258 (M.D. Ala. 1980); EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.,
375 F. Supp. 237, 244 (N.D. Ala. 1974). This result accords with the plain meaning of the
statute, which provides for a stay pending jurther efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (emphasis added). The language suggests that
some efforts must have already been made.
15. In leaving the availability of a stay to the discretion of the trial court, Congress indicates that other orders disposing of the suit are also appropriate.
16. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Magnolia Elec. Power Assn., 635 F.2d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 1981); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co.,
535 F.2d 257, 272 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); EEOC v. Home of Economy,
Inc., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1592 (D.N.D. May 20, 1982); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245 (M.D. Ala. 1980); EEOC v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678
(M.D. Fla. 1978); EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
17. See, e.g., EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass.
1979); EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (partial summary
judgment); EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1974), affd in part,
revd in part and remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. United
States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1974); EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372
F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974).
18. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2713,
at 391 (1973).
19. FED. R. C1v. P. 56; 6 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.03 (2d ed. 1982)
("The,,tenor of Rule 56 indicates that the summary judgment procedure deals with the merits
).
20. See 6 J. MOORE, supra note 19, §_56.03 ("[If summary judgment is granted] in favor of
the defendant the judgment is in bar and not in abatement."); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 18, § 2713, at 405 ("A summary judgment •.. is on the merits and purports to have
a res judicata effect on any later action.").
Note that in a more recent volume of this treatise, the authors propose modifying this
approach. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4444 (1981). They suggest that when a plaintiff seeks to rebring an action that a court has
previously refused to hear, the second court should determine whether the action was barred,
not by looking to the original order - either dismissal or summary judgment - but by considering whether barring the action would promote justice. Id., at 392. This flexible application of the claim preclusion doctrine finds additional support in the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 20(2):
A valid and final personal judgment for the defendant, which rests on the prematurity
of the action or on the plaintiffs failure to satisfy a precondition to suit, does not bar
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without prejudice,21 and leaves the Commission free to pursue further conciliation talks and to return to court should the talks fail. 22
This Note suggests that a court faced with inadequate conciliation e.fforts by the EEOC should dismiss the action without
prejudice. Part I argues that dismissal better serves the remedial
purpose of the statute than summary judgment. Part II then demonstrates that dismissal satisfies the policy concerns of courts that dispose of inadequately conciliated suits. Although dismissal may not
promote judicial efficiency as well as summary judgment, courts and
the Commission can handle the dismissal to minimize duplication.
Part III advances dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted as the appropriate procedural vehicle for disanother action by the plaintiff instituted after the claim has matured, or the precondition
has been satified, unless a second action is precluded by operation of the substantive law.
The difficulty with this in the context of summary judgment concerns the function of summary
adjudication. Summary judgment serves the primary purpose of speedily adjudicating meritless claims. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 99, at 492 (3d ed. 1976) (summary judgment is a "salutary and efficient instrumentality for expedition of the business of the
courts."). Inviting collateral attack on summary judgments to test whether they rest on the
failure to meet "a precondition" or on "the operation of substantive law" conflicts directly with
the judicial economy that justifies summary adjudication in the first instance.
In any event, courts disposing of suits for inadequate conciliation have apparently assumed
that an order of summary judgment will bar subsequent suits by the same litigants on the same
charges. See EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237, 249 (N.D. Ala.
1974) ("The Court is aware, of course, of the effect of its summary judgment upon the employees for whom the Commission seeks redress."); EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985,
994 (D. Md. 1974) ("[T]he EEOC urges the court to be mindful of the res judicala effects of a
summary judgment in this case. The court is mindful."). This assumption reflects the nearly
universal preponderance of authority. See, e.g., Martucci v. Mayer, 210 F.2d 259,260 (3d Cir,
1954) (per curiam) ("A judgment under Rule 56 goes to the merits and operates in bar of the
cause of action, not in abatement."); Garrigan v. Giese, 420 F. Supp. 68, 71 (E.D. Mo. 1976)
("A determination by summary judgment is as final a judgment as is a determination had after
a trial or hearing on uncontroverted facts."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977); Hubicki v.
United Steelworkers of America, 344 F. Supp. 1247, 1248 (M.D. Pa. 1972), affd. sub nom.
Hubicki v. ACF Indus., 484 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1973); Sopp v. Gehrlein, 236 F. Supp. 823, 825
(W.D. Pa. 1964) (''The authorities all agree that the entry of summary judgment against a
plaintiff is a general judgment in favor of a defendant and is an effective bar under the doctrine of res judicata to a subsequent action between the same parties on the same cause of
action."); Oregon v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 276,277 (D. Or. 1961) ("A summary judgment
goes to the merits of the case and operates in bar of the cause of the action."), affd., 308 F.2d
568 (9th Cir. 1962). Since courts seem to assume that claim preclusion automatically follows
summary judgment, this Note will discuss this issue as a choice between summary judgment
with res judicata effects and dismissal without prejudice.
21. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1258 (M.D. Ala. 1980); EEOC v.
Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 1978); see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
18, § 2713, at 404-05.
22. The need to file a second suit will not prejudice the Commission's case. Available back
pay is measured from the time the employee files a charge with the Commission, regardless of
when the suit is filed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). No statute oflimitations applies to suits
by the EEOC under title VII. Occidential Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977). The
employer may attack the timeliness of a suit only if he can show prejudice. 432 U.S. at 373.
See also EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (applying Adminis_trative Procedure Act's requirement that agencies proceed without "unreasonable delay" to
dismiss EEOC suit based on charges five to seven years old).
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posing of actions when the Commission has failed to satisfy the conciliation requirement.
I.

DISPOSITION

To

PROMOTE THE POLICY OF THE STATUTE

Courts consistently refuse to hear any case in which the EEOC
failed to make an adequate conciliation effort before filing suit. 23
The trial judge may dispose of such suits either by dismissing the
complaint or by granting summary judgment. Decisions announcing
the disposition of such cases, however, do not acknowledge the
choice between dismissing and granting summary judgment.24 In
practice, courts apparently dispose of unconciliated cases simply by
granting the defendant's motion, whether for dismissal or summary
judgment.25 Courts are not legally bound to grant or deny the de23. See note 12 supra. Courts have hinted only occasionally that they might entertain a
suit despite inadequate conciliation. One case stated that the Fifth Circuit has apparently
established a rule that an EEOC suit cannot be dismissed for failure to comply with Title VII's
statutory prerequisites, like conciliation, unless the failure was deliberate or prejudiced the
defendant. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1254 n.17, 1258 (M.D. Ala.
1980). The Sears court drew this rule from EEOC v. Airguide Corp., 539 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir.
1976), a case involving Title VII's notice requirement. InAirguide, the EEOC mailed notice of
the charge to respondent, but the company never received the letter. Because EEOC did
everything it could to meet the requirement, and the defendant was not shown to have suffered
prejudice due to lack of timely notice, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment and remanded the case for a determination of prejudice to the defendant.
539 F.2d at 1042. The rule established by the Fifth Circuit inAirguide should not apply to the
conciliation requirement. The strength of the legislative history supporting the conciliation
requirement, see note 42 infra and accompanying text, distinguishes it from the relatively unremarked notice requirement, and makes it unlikely that the Fifth Circuit, or any other court,
will allow the EEOC to fail to attempt conciliation. One authority, callingAirguide "scarcely
definitive," suggests that the case provides "little assistance to other courts except in the precise
situation decided." C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION§ 3.ll(b), at 331, 332 (1980).
Some courts find that negotiations not strictly part of the conciliation process nonetheless
fulfill the conciliation requirements. For example, in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), the court held that negotiating a consent decree fulfilled the conciliation requirement. 517 F.2d at 869. The court in
Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976),
rejected the idea that negotiations begun after suit was filed were sufficient, but left open "the
possibility that exceptional circumstances may excuse a failure to attempt conciliation . . . ."
535 F.2d at 272. In EEOC v. Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1162 (W.D.N.Y.
1977), the court held that presuit correspondence notifying the defendant that the EEOC intended to broaden the scope ofits discrimination charges fulfilled the conciliation requirement.
434 F. Supp. at I 166-67.
24. Two courts discussed their refusal to stay proceedings pending further conciliation efforts. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1258 (M.D. 'Ala. 1980); EEOC
v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237, 245-46 (N.D. Ala. 1974). Both courts
held that an opportunity to negotiate settlements after the EEOC files suit does not fulfill the
statutory requirement that the EEOC provide the employer an opportunity for conciliation
talks prior to filing suit. 490 F. Supp. at 1258; 375 F. Supp. at 245; see note 2 supra.
25. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245 (M.D. Ala. 1980); EEOC v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1979); EEOC v. Wilson &
Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 1978); EEOC v. East Hills Ford Sales, Inc., 445 F. Supp.
985 (W.D. Pa. 1978); EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977); EEOC
v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 757 (W.D. Va. 1974), revd. on other grounds, 532 F.2d 359
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fondant's motion as labeled; they may convert the motion into the
appropriate form. 26 Generally, they have not exercised this power.
In nearly every case where the defendant's motion specified either
dismissal or summary judgment, the court adopted that characterization for its order.27 This practice clearly affords defendants unwarranted power and allows unjustifiable inconsistency in the outcome
of similar suits.28
Instead, courts should consistently dismiss, without prejudice, inadequately conciliated suits. Dismissal does not affect the remedial
goal of the statute as severely as does summary judgment. Title VII
seeks to eliminate prejudicial discrimination in employment.29 The
1972 Act provides the EEOC with two means of pursuing this goal:
conciliation30 and litigation. 31 Dismissal leaves the EEOC free to
employ both options. Following dismissal, the Commission may renew conciliation efforts.32 If conciliation fails, the Commission may
(4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala.
1974); EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974); EEOC v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 366 F. Supp. 273 (D. Md. 1973).
In one lone case, a district court responded to defendant's motion for summary judgment
for failure to conciliate by dismissing for failure to satisfy conditions precedent to suit. See
EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1982).
26. If, on a motion asserting . . . failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . . .
FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b); see EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 606 (9th Cir. 1982); cf.
EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1981) (district court erred in grant•
ing defendant's motion to dismiss, where court should have granted stay).
27. In four cases, defendants filed alternative motions for dismissal and summary judgment. None of the courts explained why it opted for one or the other. EEOC v. Sherwood
Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Fla. 1978); EEOC v. Brown Transp. Corp., 15 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1976); EEOC v. National Cash Register Co., 405 F.
Supp. 562 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (both motions denied); EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385
F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1974), affd in part, revd in par/ and remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d
590 (4th Cir. 1976).
28. For example, EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 1978), and EEOC
v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1974), presented nearly
identical factual situations and theories to the court. In both cases the Commission failed to
include the union in conciliation talks with the employer. In neither case was there any discussion of EEOC misconduct. Yet in Wilson the court dismissed without prejudice, 452 F. Supp.
at 205, while in U.S. Pipe the court granted summary judgment. 375 F. Supp. at 249.
For other examples of cases with similar fact situations but different outcomes, see EEOC
v. Magnolia Elec. Power Assn., 635 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981) (comparing itself to U.S. Pipe);
compare Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
920 (1976), with EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass.
1979); compare EEOC v. National Cash Register Co., 405 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ga. 1975), with
EEOC v. East Hills Ford Sales, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 985 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
29. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
News 2391, 2401 ("The purpose of this title is to eliminate . . . discrimination in employment
").
30. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
31. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202, 205 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (court, in
dismissing, stated that "the commission, union and employer should make a sincere attempt to

....
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bring a new suit against the defendant. 33
In contrast, summary judgment renders further action by the
EEOC ineffectual. The res judicata effect of summary judgment
bars the Commission from subsequently filing suit on the same
charges.34 Without the threat of suit, the employer has little incentive to negotiate a settlement. 35 Thus, further conciliation efforts
would probably fail. Summary judgment virtually compels the
EEOC to rely on suits brought by the charging individuals as the
only means of remedying discrimination.
Congress has expressed dissatisfaction with reliance on individual suits.36 The 1972 amendments to Title VII shifted the onus of
enforcement from individuals to the government.37 According to the
Act's legislative history, Congress feared that individuals lacked the
capability and the motivation to pursue judicial relief. 38 Yet courts
that order summary judgment entrust the statute's enforcement
solely to individual suits, a result clearly contrary to congressional
intent. 39
Dismissal interferes less than summary judgment with Title VII's
resolve the controversy through conference and conciliation"). Note that the statute explicitly
provides for further conciliation during a stay. See note 13 supra.
33. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text
34. See note 20 supra.
35. See notes 57-59 infra and accompanying text.
36. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 2137, 2144; 118 Cong. Rec. 4941 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams).
31. See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1971) ("It is expected that [private suits]
will be the exception and not the rule."); see also General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326
(1980) (''The EEOC was to bear the primary burden of litigation ..." under the 1972 Act.);
EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 373 (4th Cir. 1976).
38. Recognizing the disparity between litigants, the Senate Report called the private employment discrimination suit a" 'modem day David and Goliath confrontation'." S. REP. No.
415, supra note 37, at 17 (footnote omitted). The Report also observed that "those persons
whose economic disadvantage was a prime reason for enactment of equal employment opportunity provisions find that their only recourse in the face of unyielding discrimination [private
suits] is one that is time consuming, burdensome, and all too often, financially prohibitive."
Id. at 4.
39. Conceivably, summary judgment against the Commission may also bar suits by the
individual complainant. The Act provides:
The person . • . aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the
Commission . . . . [I]f within one hundred and eighty days from the filings of such charge
. • . the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section . • . the Commission
. . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days . . . a civil action may be
brought against the respondent named in the charge • • . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t)(l). This language would seem to permit private suits only if the Commission has not filed a suit. See McLain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.
1977); Crump v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 369 F. Supp. 637, 637-38 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
Dicta in various cases suggest that summary judgment against the Commission will result
in barring subsequent prosecution of the underlying individual claims. See EEOC v. Burlington N., Inc., 644 F.2d 717, 721 n.14 (8th Cir. 1981) ("Implicit in our holding is the possibility
that if bad faith or prejudice is shown, relief for a charging party, who has relied on the EEOC
to litigate her claim, may be barred."); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.
1980); EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237, 249 (N.D. Ala. 1974)
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purpose of eliminating employment discrimination. Summary judgment impedes rather than promotes that purpose by foreclosing any
subsequent EEOC action and jeopardizing individual suits. Dismissal, on the other hand, leaves the prospects for enforcement exactly
where they stood before the Commission filed suit.

II.

DISPOSITION To PROMOTE THE PoLiCIES RECOGNIZED BY THE

COURTS

In refusing to hear suits before the Commission has made an adequate conciliation effort, courts deter judicial enforcement of Title
VII's primary goal. In disposing of such suits, however, courts promote other policies. These policies - encouraging voluntary compliance through conciliation, punishing misconduct by the EEOC,
and promoting judicial efficiency - do not suffer, and may benefit,
from decisions to dismiss rather than to grant summary judgment.40
(''The court is aware, of course, of the effect of its summary judgment upon the employees for
whom the Commission seeks redress.").
Trovillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520,521 (5th Cir. 1980), illustrates an alternative approach, based on a jurisdictional analysis of the conciliation requirement. The Fifth
Circuit concluded that "the judgment in Suit I [EEOC v. King's Daugthers Hosp., 12 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 484 (S.D. Miss. 1976)] has no res judicata effects as to the EEOC
. . . ." 614 F.2d at 525. As such it could have no res judicata effects against the individual
claimant. 614 F.2d at 525. For a discussion of the opinion's rationale, see notes 88-92 iefra
and accompanying text. The court refused to limit Mrs. Trovillion to her right to intervention
because "[t]here is no right and no obligation to intervene in a defective suit." 614 F.2d at 526.
A subsequent Fifth Circuit opinion indicates the uncertainty in this area. Less than a
month after Truvil/ion, Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1980), held that
dismissal with prejudice in an EEOC action can and did bar a subsequent individual action on
the same charge. Wisdom, J., wrote the opinion in both cases. In both he characterized the
district court orders as dismissals that did not specify ''without prejudice." Interpreting FED.
R. C1v. P. 41(b), he concluded that the dismissal in Truvillion (for failure to investigate a
charge thoroughly) was without prejudice, 614 F.2d at 524-25, but the dismissal in Jones (for
inordinate delay in processing the charge and filing suit) was with prejudice. 614 F.2d at 1390.
, The conciliation requirement is more closely akin to the investigation requirement; both arise
from the same section of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). Jones strongly suggests,
however, that a prior order of summary judgment can be held to bar an individual suit.
40. Courts do not seem to link the policies they are serving to their choice of disposition.
Thus there is no obvious preference for dismissal or summary judgment among courts that
encourage conciliation, compare Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976), and EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245
(M.D. Ala. 1980), and EEOC v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Fla. 1978),
and EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (all dismissing suit), with
EEOC v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1979), and EEOC v.
Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977), and EEOC v. United States Pipe &
Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1974), and EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp.
985 (D. Md. 1974) (all granting summary judgment), courts that seek to punish EEOC misconduct, compare EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1974), affd. in
part, revd. in part and remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976), and EEOC v.
Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974) (both granting summary judgment), with
EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978) (granting stay), and EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (alternative holding dismissing suit), courts that
are protecting their jurisdiction, compare EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F.
Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1979), and EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907 (D.
Md. 1974), affd. in part, revd. in part and remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir.
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A. Encouraging Compliance Through Conciliation
One policy concern motivating courts adjudicating Title VII litigation is the desire to protect the integrity of the conciliation requirement.41 Congress intended to enforce Title VII rights primarily
through informal means.42 Until 1972, the EEOC could only seek
voluntary compliance,43 and a cause of action was granted only toindividuals.44 The 1972 amendments allow the EEOC to bring
suit.45 Since Congress expressly made the Commission's power to
sue dependent upon the failure of conciliation,46 the courts have concluded that Congress still favors conciliation as the primary method
of handling charges of employment discrimination.47 The Act as
1976), and EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (all
granting summary judgment), with EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla.
1978) (dismissing suit), and EEOC v. Magnolia Elec. Power Assn., 635 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981)
(reversing District Court dismissal for lack of jurisdiction), and EEOC v. Pet, Inc., Funsten
Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1980) (percuriam) (same result as Magnolia), and courts that
emphasize judicial efficiency, compare EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F.
Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1979) (granting summary judgment), and EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines,
436 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977), and EEOC v. Brown Transp. Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1062 (N.D. Ga 1976) (all granting partial summary judgment), with EEOC v.
McLean Trucking Co., 64 F.R.D. 643 (W.D. Tenn. 1974), modified, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 302 (1974) (dismissing suit), revd and remanded, 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975).
41. See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 272 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 920 (1976); EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341, 349 (D.
Mass. 1979); EEOC v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678, 683 (M.D. Fla. 1978);
EEOC v. Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); EEOC v.
United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237,241 (N.D. Ala. 1974); EEOC v. Westvaco
Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 988 (D. Md. 1974). Several cases dealing with other prerequisites to
suit by the EEOC demonstrate similar deference to the congressional policy favoring conciliation. See EEOC v. Brown Transp. Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1062, 1068 (N.D.
Ga. 1976) (requirement that scope of judicial complaint not exceed the scope of the charge);
EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 757 (W.D. Va. 1974) (same), revd., 532 F.2d 359 (4th
Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 366 F. Supp. 273,275 (D. Md. 1973) (requirement that EEOC notify employer of failure of conciliation).
42. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) ("Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving [the] goal [of Title
Vil]."); Moore v. City of San Jose, 615 F.2d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 1980) ("In enacting Title VII,
Congress has specifically endorsed voluntary compliance and settlement as the preferred
means of achieving the elimination of unlawful employment discrimination.").
43. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 241, 259-61 (amended
1972); see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 325 (1980).
44. See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 325 (1980).
45. See note 2 supra.
46. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 272 (4th Cir.) (The conciliation provision "has been construed to create an express condition on the commission's power
to sue."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 366 F.
Supp. 273,275 (D. Md. 1973) ("The language of the Act conveys a clear Congressional intent
that a bona fide attempt at conciliation by the EEOC is a precondition to its filing suit.").
47. See EEOC v. American Natl. Bank, 652 F.2d ll76, ll84 (4th Cir. 198l)(''The EEOC's
new role as an enforcer, however, was not intended to diminish its role as conciliator."), cert.
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1982) (No. 81-2358); EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F.
Supp. 202,203 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (''The Congressional intent that the EEOC should primarily
attempt to eradicate discrimination in employment through conciliation was not changed [by
the 1972 Act] •..."); EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
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amended does not abandon efforts to seek voluntary compliance, but
provides greater incentive for employers to comply voluntarily. 48
The courts, therefore, have reasoned that adjudicating disputes prior
to serious conciliation efforts would undermine an important congressional policy.49
Both dismissal and summary judgment protect the integrity of
the conciliation requirement. As long as the courts scrupulously refuse to hear all suits brought by the EEOC without adequate conciliation efforts, the EEOC cannot circumvent the conciliation
requirement. so Regardless of the disposition courts select, the EEOC
("Although the 1972 Amendments gave the EEOC the power of an enforcer, they did not
change its responsibility as a conciliator." (footnote omitted)); EEOC v. Pierce & Stevens
Chem. Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237, 242 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
The support for conciliation is ambiguous in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments. After the Act was reported out of committee, Senator Dominick introduced an amendment replacing a provision authorizing the EEOC to issue cease and desist orders with the
power to bring suit in federal district court. Senator Dominick intended his amendment to
"take over at the level where conciliations fail . . . ." 118 CONG. REC. 589 (1972). Representative Perkins, the senior House conferee, held a similar opinion: "Only if conciliation proves
to be impossible do we expect the Commission to bring action in Federal district court to seek
enforcement." 118 CoNG. REC. 7563 (1972). Courts, relying on such statements, have reasoned that Congress intended to continue to rely primarily upon voluntary compliance. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 988 (D. Md. 1974).
The belief that the 1972 Amendments reflected unflagging support for conciliation, however, may merit reevaluation. Congress' disenchantment with conciliation was equally apparent in the record. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 36; 118 CONG. REC. 4932 (1972)
(Commission conciliated with total or partial success in fewer than half of all cases where
reasonable cause was found.). At least one court believed Congress intended to relegate con•
ciliation to the back seat and rely primarily on court action. See EEOC v. General Elec. Co.,
532 F.2d 359, 373 (4th Cir. 1976).
48. See EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 449 (6th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell
Co., 507 F.2d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 1974); H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 36, at 11, 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 2147.
49. See EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341, 349 (D. Mass.
1979) ("If failure to comply with statutory procedures might be excused, . . . courts could
easily be transformed into the primary agency for Title VII enforcement, a result at odds with
the statutory scheme."); EEOC v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678, 683 (M.D. Fla.
1978) ("The only construction of the statute which is at all in harmony with the Congressional
desire for conciliation is that the Commission's authority to sue is conditioned upon full compliance with the administrative process - investigation, determination, and conciliation with respect to each discriminatory practice alleged."); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
366 F. Supp. 273 (D. Md. 1973).
50. The EEOC might be able to circumvent the conciliation requirement by waiting for an
individual to bring suit, then intervening in that action. The individual may sue regardless of
the EEOC's failure to attempt conciliation. Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645,
652 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969). The EEOC may be permitted to intervene despite its failure to attempt conciliation. See Johnson v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co.,
558 F.2d 841, 847 (8th Cir. 1977). But see Harris v. Anaconda Aluminum Co., 479 F. Supp. 11
(N.D. Ga. 1979). This technique is unreliable, since it is not certain that the individual will
bring suit. In addition, the courts are alert to the possibility of attempted circumvention. See
EEOC v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 506 F. Supp. 480,483 (D. Mass. 1981); National
Org. for Women v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 73 F.R.D 467, 471 (D. Minn. 1977). Intervention will be limited to the issues the individual could raise; the EEOC may not expand the
scope of the individual suit. National Org.far Women, 73 F.R.D. at 471.

December 1982)

Note-Failure To Attempt Conciliation

443

must attempt conciliation before the action may proceed.
The Commission's attempts to complete conciliation are more effective after dismissal than summary judgment. The possibility of a
second suit based on the same charges provides an incentive for the
employer to negotiate after dismissal; the original action makes more
credible the threat of subsequent legal action.51 In contrast, since
summary judgment bars later government suits,52 it significantly
reduces the incentive to make concessions. The threat of private actions53 or different charges54 exerts substantially less influence on the
employer.
B. Punishing EEOC Misconduct

By refusing to hear actions absent an adequate attempt to resolve
the dispute without litigation, some courts seem to see themselves as
punishing EEOC misconduct. Although this punitive purpose does
not explicitly appear as the reason for disposing of a case, the language of some opinions suggests a desire to sanction Commission
wrongdoing. In the first case to require conciliation prior to suit,55
the court emphasized that the EEOC's "derelictions . . . were . . .
bald and unambiguous violations of the plain language of its own
rules," 56 and accused the EEOC of "fiout[ing] in essential particulars
Title VII and its own regulations . . . ." 57 In another suit, the court
granted summary judgment after hearing evidence that the EEOC
attorney "singlehandedly spoiled out-of-court settlement of this
case."58 Appellate courts have reversed both dismissal and summary
51. The district court in EEOC v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341,
346 (D. Mass. 1979), acknowledged the "psychological factor of the imminent commencement
of a lawsuit." Cf. Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 375 (8th Cir. 1974) (action
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in which "[t]he District Court succinctly
and perceptively held that '[v]oluntary compliance through conciliation, conference, and persuasion is more likely to be effected when the employer clearly understands that the matter will
proceed at a level beyond that of the compliance officer if there is not a voluntary resolution of
the dispute' ").
52. See note 20 supra.
53. "In cases posing the most profound consequences, respondents have more often than
not shrugged off the Commission's entreaties and relied upon the unlikelihood of the parties
suing them." H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 36, at 9, 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS, at
2144; see notes 41-44 supra and accompanying text.
54. The employer can avoid new charges entirely by ending its discriminatory practices.
While this result is desirable, the summary judgment has nonetheless permitted the employer
to escape backpay liability to those persons injured by its past acts of discrimination. Dismissal would preserve that potential liability despite prospective improvements.
55. EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974). In Westvaco, the Commission filed suit without timely determination ofreasonable cause or any effort to conciliate. 372
F. Supp. at 990.
56. 372 F. Supp. at 993.
57. 372 F. Supp. at 991.
58. EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527,532 (10th Cir. 1978). The district court had found that
the EEOC "improperly refused to continue to conciliate in good faith." 582 F.2d at 532.
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judgment, holding that the lower courts had acted harshly. 59
Courts should not use summary judgment as a sanction against
EEOC misconduct. The res judicata effect of summary judgment is
drastic, especially given the availability of lesser but effective penalties. Egregious Commission misconduct, such as harassment, has
not prevailed as an affirmative defense to EEOC charges, 60 or as
grounds for summary judgment.61 Inadequate conciliation may not
involve Commission misconduct,62 so that the harsh penalty of summary judgment seems inappropriate.
Courts may effectively punish EEOC misconduct while dismissing the suit. Dismissal itself imposes a minor sanction; the
Commission, already overburdened, 63 must take the time not only to
refile the suit, but also to remedy the defect in conciliation that led to
the dismissal. 64 If dismissal alone offers an inadequate penalty,
courts may provide additional sanctions by awarding attorneys' fees
against the Commission. 65 Several courts have held that dismissal
qualifies a defendant as a "prevailing party" for purposes of awarding costs.66 Such a sanction bears a more rational relationship to the
Commission's misconduct than does permanently precluding a po59. See EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam);
EEOC v. Pet, Inc., Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001, 1002 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). See
also EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1982)
(District Court, in dismissing inadequately conciliated suit, found: "The EEOC's obvious disregard for such promulgated regulations is the apex of unreasonableness.").
60. EEOC v. First Natl. Bap.k, 614 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
917 (1981).
61. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1253-54 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (EEOC
misconduct amounting to harassment is not appropriate ground for summary judgment).
62. See C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 23, at 330 ("[M]ost defaults
[of statutory requirements] probably occur not because of the agency's willful refusal to comply but rather from the inevitable mistakes inherent in processing a huge volume of charges
with inadequate resources.").
63. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 369-70 (1977); B. ScHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMATION LAW 769 ()976).
64. Failure to remedy the misconduct could lead to a second dismissal. The pattern could
continue indefinitely. Misconduct prejudicing defendants could lead to a permanent dismissal.
See Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1980).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). The Ninth Circuit approved the award of attorneys'
fees in a case dismissed for failure to conciliate in EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605,
609 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)
(Court may award attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case "upon a finding
that the _plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not
brought m subjective bad faith.").
66. See EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978);
see also EEOC v. First Natl. Bank, 614 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
917 (1981) (reversing award of attorney's fees because it reversed the dismissal); EEOC v.
McLean Trucking Co., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 301 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (awarding costs
but not attorneys' fees). Whenever costs are awarded the court may, in its discretion, include
attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). The statute does not, however, distinguish
cases in which attorneys' fees are appropriate from cases in which only court costs may be
awarded. § 2000e-5(k).
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tentially meritorious action against discriminatory employment
practices.

.

C. Promoting Judicial Efficiency

Courts have refused to hear suits before adequate conciliation
because of concern for judicial efficiency. When the EEOC brings
several different charges against a defendant without pursuing conciliation regarding all the charges, two dangers arise: the Commission may require more discovery, and the suit may cover a broader
range of issues, requiring a longer and more complex trial. 67 Courts
therefore prefer to dispose of charges which the Commission has not
made the subject of settlement negotiations, and proceed expeditiously with a simpler trial. 68
Dismissal prevents protracted litigation by permitting trial to
proceed only on those issues properly prepared by the EEOC.69
Summary judgment achieves the same advantage, but at the cost of
preventing subsequent action on the counts severed from the
complaint.
Courts that are concerned about judicial efficiency may hesitate
to dismiss inadequately conciliated suits. Duplicative litigation may
follow the bringing of similar charges against a number of defendants, some of whom are dismissed.70 Summary judgment prevents
duplicative litigation. If the court decides the ·case for some defen61. See EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (granting partial
summary judgment on allegations concerning management, professional and technical personnel, but retaining allegations concerning flight attendants). The Allegheny court believed that
limiting suit to the narrower issues would speed discovery and simplify the trial. 436 F. Supp.
at 1307.
68. q: EEOC v. Brown Transp. Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1062, 1068-69
(N.D. Ga. 1976) (dictum supports limiting scope of EEOC investigation to prevent unduly
delaying relief to charging party).
69. In some cases, the court may grant a motion to strike some charges. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Fla. 1978). The net effect is the same. The
stricken count is not properly before the court, therefore no judgment on its merits is reached.
70. See EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341, (D. Mass. 1979)
(I.B.E.W. I); EEOC v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 506 F. Supp. 480 (D. Mass. 1981)
(I.B.E.W. II); cf. EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1975) (permittingjoinder of union not named in employee's charge against employer). TheLB.E. W. I court
dismissed the EEOC's suit against the International for failure to attempt conciliation despite
the potential for inconsistent judgments against the local, which had participated in conciliation. 476 F. Supp. at 350. Subsequently, the LB.E. W. II court held that the charging party,
who had intervened in the EEOC suit, could proceed independently against the International
despite dismissal of the EEOC complaint against it. 506 F. Supp. at 483. In dictum, the court
mentioned the possibility of EEOC intervention in the private plaintiffs action against the
International. 506 F. Supp. at 483.
Theoretically duplication could arise if the EEOC brought two different charges against the
same employer, but only attempted conciliation on one of them. Different charges, however,
may not raise similar issues of fact. Facts relevant to a race discrimination charge, for example, may not apply to a sex discrimination charge. Thus, dismissal might pave the way for two
simple suits rather than one complex suit. See EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp.
1300, 1307 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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dants on the merits, the EEOC cannot resurrect the charges against
them in a subsequent action. Elimination of the EEOC suit, however, may give rise to several individual suits,71 undercutting judicial
efficiency.
Dismissal poses a more substantial risk of duplication. If concilition with the dismissed defendants fails and the EEOC brings a second suit against them, the adjudication of substantially similar issues
in separate cases may squander judicial resources. 72 Both the courts
and the Commission, however, can minimize the threat of duplication. Courts may avoid duplication either by joining dismissed defendants73 or by dismissing all defendants.74 If some defendants are
dismissed fairly early in the proceedings, the EEOC may be able to
remedy its failure and file suit again before the original suit is ready
for trial. The court may then decide to consolidate the actions for
trial.7 5 When the court dismisses one defendant, the EEOC could
enhance the court's consolidation effort by voluntarily dismissing its
suit against the others.76 If conciliation efforts against the dismissed
defendant fail, the Commission could refile the entire action. 77
Either dismissal or summary judgment accommodates the courts'
reasons for refusing to hear inadequately conciliated suits - encour11. But see note 39 supra and accompanying text.
12. See EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300, 1307 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (recognizing EEOC concerns regarding delays and wasted resources, but holding that such factors did
not outweigh those favoring dismissal).
73. Courts are understandably reluctant to permit the EEOC to join parties not privy to
conciliation talks. In the only case in which a court joined an indispensable party to an EEOC
suit, it appears that the Commission did attempt some conciliation with that party. See EEOC
v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975), revg. 64 F.R.D. 643 (W.D. Tenn,
1974), mod!fted, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 302 (1974); see also FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a); cf.
Curran v. Portland Superintending School Comm., Portland, Me., 435 F.Supp. 1063, 1074 (D.
Me. 1977) (private plaintiff failed to name party in charge filed with EEOC; dismissal denied
where party was indispensable and received actual notice).
14. See EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 1978); see also FED, R,
C1v. P. 19(b).
75. FED. R. C1v. P. 42(a) gives courts authority to consolidate actions to promote efficient
judicial administration. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 97 (3d ed. 1976).
16. See FED. R. C1v. P. 41(a).
77. FED. R. C1v. P. 41(a)(2) permits voluntary dismissal only upon "such terms and conditions as the court deems proper." Id. The court could effectively veto the EEOC's voluntary
dismissal by specifying that such dismissal would be with prejudice. The court, thus, has
power to decide that proceeding promptly against the remaining defendant outweighs the desire to keep the actions consolidated.
A delay in proceedings against the defendant properly before the court may prejudice that
defendant by subjecting it to greater liability for backpay than it would face if the suit proceeded at once. However, the court need not force the defendant to assume that liability in
order to preserve a unified suit. The court could utilize its equitable powers to adjust the period
for which the defendant is liable for back pay to account for the delay in proceedings. Cf.
EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1976) (limiting backpay liability to
two years before employer actually received notice of sex discrimination claims). Courts
should consider limiting defendant backpay liability for the period of delay as a condition
upon voluntary dismissal.

December 1982]

Note-Failure To Attempt Conciliation

447

aging conciliation, punishing EEOC misconduct, and promoting judicial efficiency. Dismissal does pose some risk of duplicative
litigation, but the courts and the Commission can minimize the
chance of duplication. More importantly, dismissal, because it
leaves the EEOC free to refile the same charges after conciliation is
perfected, interferes less with Title VII's aim of eliminating employment discrimination than does summary judgment, which bars subsequent suit under the doctrine of res judicata. Generally, courts
should secure the central goal of Title VII before seeking to meet
secondary goals.78 Accordingly, dismissal is the appropriate disposition for inadequately conciliated cases.

III. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 12(B)
Some courts have characterized the conciliation requirement as a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. Because dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is always without prejudice,79 this procedure initially appears
attractive. More rigorous analysis, however, indicates that the appropriate procedure is dismissal for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, provided for in rule 12(b)(6). Since such
a disposition is presumptively prejudicial, the court should expressly
note in its order that the dismissal is without prejudice to an action
brought once the Commission has satisfied the conciliation requirement. 80 The provision of rule 12 that the consideration of material
outside the pleadings requires treating and disposing of a 12(b)(6)
motion as a motion for summary judgment does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to this approach.

· A. Jurisdictional Analysis
Some courts have refused to hear cases prior to adequate conciliation for lack of jurisdiction.81 The procedural requirements of Title
78. See Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("We do not
believe that the procedures of Title VII were intended to serve as a stumbling block to the
accomplishment of the statutory objective."); Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 432 F.
Supp. 390, 397 (W.D. La. 1977) (administrative procedure "should not override the overall
purpose of Title VII, to provide redress from employment discrimination").
79. FED. R. C1v. P. 4I(b)
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as
an adjudication upon the merits.
80. See FED. R. C1v. P. 4l(b). The rule allows the court to specify that its dismissal is not
an adjudication of the merits.
81. EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1979);
EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202, 204-05 (W.D. Okla. 1978); EEOC v. Raymond
Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907, 911-12 (D. Md. 1974), ajfd in part, revd in part and remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237, 244 (N.D. Ala. 1974); see EEOC v. Magnolia Elec. Power Assn., 635
F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981) (district court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds); EEOC v. Pet, Inc.,
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VII, like conciliation, establish conditions precedent to suit; 82 these
courts have also held that satisfying the conciliation requirement is
necessary for jurisdiction.83
If conciliation is a jurisdictional prerequisite, courts must dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction suits that do not fulfill that prerequisite. 84 A
summary judgment order under these circumstances exceeds the trial
court's authority, for without jurisdiction the court cannot adjudicate
the merits. 85 Respect for the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts
therefore precludes, rather than justifies, granting a motion for summary judgment.
The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with a condition precedent can be treated
like a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which does not bar
subsequent suits. 86 The Fifth Circuit recently applied this doctrine
to limit the res judicata consequences of a summary judgment order
predicated on the Commission's failure adequately to investigate a
discrimination charge. In Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hospital, 81
the individual claimant brought suit after the district court had
Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (district court dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds); see also EEOC v. American Natl. Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1185 (4th Cir.
1981) (found conciliation jurisdictional, but held conciliation efforts adequate on the facts),
cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1982) (No. 81-2358).
82. E.g., EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1333 (D. Del. 1974), ajfd., 516 F.2d 1297 (3d
Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Container Corp. of America, 352 F. Supp. 262, 265 (M.D. Fla. 1972),
83. See note 81 supra and accompanying text. The requirement that the EEOC defer to
action by state employment discrimination agencies has been considered jurisdictional, Carey
v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 598 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1979), ajfd on other grounds, 447 U.S.
54 (1980). In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982), the Supreme Court
recently reversed the Seventh Circuit's holding that timely filing of an EEOC charge was a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. 102 S. Ct. at 1132.
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(l) authorizes dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
85. A court without jurisdiction to hear the merits of a case cannot render judgment on the
merits. E.g., O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 551 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1977); Dassinger v.
South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 505 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Thompson v. United
States, 291 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1961); Campbell v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Intl., 452 F. Supp. 930
(W.D. Pa. 1978).
86. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961). The Court created an exception to
dismissal operating as an adjudication on the merits for "those dismissals which are based on a
plaintiffs failure to comply with a precondition requisite to the Court's going forward to determine the merits of his substantive claims." 365 U.S. at 285. Cf. Schuy v. Susquehanna Corp.,
419 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970) (dictum that dismissal on grountls of
prematurity must be without prejudice). The Costello approach of selectively characterizing
preconditions to suit as jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional has been justly condemned for
adopting an amorphous standard_based on an inaccurate use of the word •~urisdictional." See
18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4435, at 335
(1969) ("This method of interpreting Rule 4l(b) is directly objectionable because it involves so
slippery a method of manipulating the concept of jurisdiction."), The application of the Cos•
tello doctrine to Title VIl's conciliation requirement illustrates its deficiencies.
87. 614 F.2d 520, 524 (5th Cir. 1980); see also EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F.
Supp. 1245, 1258 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (citing Costello) (dismissal for failure to conciliate is not on
the merits and should be without prejudice).
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found, inter alia, the Commission's investigation efforts insufficient
to sustain a suit. 88 The district court had cast this conclusion in the
procedural form of a summary judgment order, 89 which the defendant interposed as a bar to the second suit by the individual.90 Judge
Wisdom reasoned that because the district court had characterized
the investigation requirement as a ''jurisdictional prerequisite," it
had no power to order summary judgment on the merits.91 Consequently, a jurisdictional disposition of the Commission's action
could not preclude the subsequent suit by the individual claimant.92
Under this analysis, the same jurisdictional deficiency that renders
summary judgment improper ensures that an erroneous summary
judgment order will not bar a subsequent suit once the plaintiff can
establish the jurisdictional prerequisites.
Although elegant, the Trovillion approach does not provide a
comprehensive solution to the problem of selecting a procedural device to dipose of Title VII suits for inadequate conciliation efforts.
First, not all courts agree that the conciliation requirement must be
fulfilled before jurisdiction to hear the suit exists.93 Some courts
deny that conciliation is a jurisdictional requirement. 94 Other courts
fail to consider jurisdiction explicitly in refusing to hear an inadequately conciliated case.95 Still other courts hold conciliation juris88. 614 F.2d at 522-23.
89. EEOC v. King's Daughters Hosp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 484, 490 (S.D.
Miss. 1976).
90. 614 F.2d at 523.
91. 614 F.2d at 522-24. The opinion does not clearly state whether the statutory preconditions to suit are jurisdictional, or simply procedural prerequisites which should be treated like
jurisdictional questions. A similar ambiguity pervades the Costello opinion. Regardless of the
terminology, a finding that the preconditions to suit have not been met is outcome determinative, rather than a question of forum or procedure. The critique in the text applies to any
disposition of a claim for failure to meet prerequisites to suit that purports to be other than "on
the merits."
92. 614 F.2d at 525.
93. Although courts have stated that conciliation is jurisdictional or not jurisdictional, they
have failed to develop a reasoned approach for determining whether a procedural requirement
is jurisdictional. See, e.g., EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341,
344-45 (D. Mass. 1979) (jurisdictional); EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 991 (D.
Md. 1974) (not jurisdictional). Instead, the courts' approaches seem results-oriented. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982), after applying a detailed three part test, concluded:
By holding compliance with the filing period to be not a jurisdictional prerequisite to
filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so
requires, we honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the
particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.
102 S. Ct. at 1135 (emphasis added).
94. See EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 991 (D. Md. 1974) (failure to conciliate does not go to jurisdiction); see also EEOC v. Standard Forge & Axle Co., 496 F.2d 1392,
1395 (5th Cir. 1974) (statutory procedures are conditions precedent, and may be pleaded
generally).
95. Several courts dismiss without reaching the question of jurisdiction. See EEOC v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1981); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535
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clictional, but reason that any attempt to conciliate satisfies the
requirement sufficiently to provide the court with jurisdiction; adequacy of conciliation does not present a jurisdictional problem. 96
Precedents that characterize the conciliation requirement as substantive rather than jurisdictional leave little room for the Truvillion approach, limiting the number of jurisdictions that may rely on it.
Second, the jurisdictional label does not accurately describe the
operation of the conciliation requirement. Whether or not inadequate conciliation efforts implicate jurisdiction, they certainly preclude judicial relief by preventing the court from hearing the merits.
Under the jurisdictional approach, no court has jurisdiction to hear
such a claim. Only a transparent fiction can maintain the distinction
between substance and jurisdiction in such cases.97 In similar cases
of redundant jurisdictional and substantive prerequisites to recovery,
the desire to do justice on the merits has persuaded the courts to treat
the condition as substantive.98 In perhaps the closest analogy, failF.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); see also EEOC v. Sherwood Medical
Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Fla. 1978); EEOC v. National Cash Register Co., 405 F. Supp.
562 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (granting motions to strike).
96. See EEOC v. California Teachers Assn., 534 F. Supp. 209, 213 n.3 (N.D. Calif. 1982)
("The sufficiency of a conciliation effort by the EEOC does not present a jurisdictional question, so long as a conciliation attempt has been made."); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504
F. Supp. 241,262 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("Attempt to conciliate is the prevailing standard . . . . The
sufficiency of the conciliation effort presents a question of whether the court should stay the
proceeding for further conciliation, not whether it has jurisdiction over the cause."); see also
EEOC v. North Cent. Airlines, 475 F. Supp. 667, 669 (D. Minn. 1979) ("When absolutely no
conciliation has occurred, the courts have no jurisdiction over the EEOC suit.") (emphasis
original).
97. The classic test of subject matter jurisdiction is whether "the right of the petitioners to
recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United
States are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another." Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946). "Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the
averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For
it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the
merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction." 327 U.S. at 682.
98. Motions to dismiss Sherman Act complaints offer a close analogy, because the statute
authorizes a cause of action only for practices "in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Thus recovery on the merits depends on an interstate
commerce nexus sufficient to sustain subject matter jurisdiction. The courts have been reluctant to grant 12(b)(l) motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in such cases. Rather, they
prefer to hear the merits, initially through a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. This approach ensures that the complaint will be viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, and more frequently enables the plaintiff to initiate discovery which may reinforce his claim to both jurisdiction and recovery. "(T]he better analysis [would be] to treat an
insufficient plea of effect upon interstate commerce as a failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted rather than lack of jurisdiction (in the sense of power) over the subject
matter." Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp., Sll F.2d 678,681 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc),revd,
425 U.S. 738 (1976). The Supreme Court agreed that the issue should be cast as a 12(b)(6)
motion, but noted that "[i]n either event, the critical inquiry is into the adequacy of the nexus
between respondents' conduct and interstate commerce that is alleged in the complaint." 425
U.S. at 742 n.l. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 549 F.2d 884, 897-98 (3d Cir.
1977); A. Cherney Disposal Co. v. Chicago & Suburban Refuse Disposal Assn., 484 F.2d 751,
759 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974); McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens for
Decency Comm., 374 F.2d 359, 363 (5th Cir.) (''where the factual and jurisdictional issues are
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ure to exhaust administrative remedies is generally viewed as a substantive question properly within judicial discretion, rather than as a
jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial authority.99 These considerations support characterizing the conciliation requirement as an essential element of the Commission's cause of action, unencumbered
by amorphous jurisdictional pretensions. 100
Finally, the Supreme Court's recent characterization of Title
VII's filing periods as substantive rather than jurisdictional casts serious doubt on the Truvillion approach. In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 101 the Court held "compliance with the filing period to be
not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so requires." 102 Three considerations - the structure of Title VII, the
congressional policy underlying the Act, and the reasoning of prior
cases - led the Court to this result. 103 Applied to the conciliation
requirement, these considerations suggest rejecting the jurisdictional
approach.
In Zipes, the Court noted Title VII's jurisdictional provision is
separate from, and makes no mention of, the timely filing requirements.104 This analysis applies to the conciliation requirement as
well. 105 The Court also relied on evidence of congressional purpose
completely intermeshed the jurisdictional issues should be referred to the merits, for it is impossible to decide the one without the other''), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 896 (1967).
99. Absent a statutory exhaustion provision that speaks directly to jurisdiction, such as that
presented in Weinberger v. Salli, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), the exhaustion requirement is not an
inflexible jurisdictional prerequisite but a judicial doctrine to be adapted to the facts of each
particular case. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969); South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1192 n.l (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980); Association of Natl.
Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1156-58 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980);
Montgomery v. Rumsfeld, 572 F.2d 250, 252-53 (9th Cir. 1978). Since Title VII's conciliation
requirement does not directly address jurisdiction, see notes 104-07 i,ifra and accompanying
text, this analogy suggests that the conciliation prerequisite is nonjurisdictional. Moreover, in
the exhaustion context, adjudication by the courts ousts the jurisdiction of executive agencies,
implicating the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. This concern does not apply to
Title VIl's conciliation requirement, which has the object of committing the resolution of the
dispute to the parties themselves, rather than to another branch of the government.
100. Even courts that adopt jurisdictional language recognize this reality. ''These courts
and others sometimes speak in terms of the defect being jurisdictional. But often they do
assert continuing authority over the matter." EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir.
1978). The Truvillion court, for example, notes that "[t]he requirements of E.E.O.C.'s notice to
the respondent and a good faith investigation by the E.E.O.C. in a loose sense might be treated
as jurisdictional. They are, however, nothing more than procedural prerequisites to the court's
determination of the substantive issues." 614 F.2d at 524.
101. 102 S.Ct. 1127 (1982).
102. 102 S.Ct. at 1135.
103. 102 S.Ct. at 1132.
104. 102 S.Ct. at 1132-33.
105. The conciliation requirement is imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t)(l) (1976); the jurisdictional provision is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t)(3). The conciliation proviso does
not refer to jurisdiction, and the jurisdictional provision does not mention conciliation.
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contained in the relevant legislative history. 106 With respect to conciliation, Congress plainly intended to limit the Commission's ability
to sue without appropriate settlement efforts, rather than to limit the
authority of the district courts. 107 The Supreme Court has not decided a case turning on the characterization of the conciliation requirement, and the Zipes opinion suggests the danger of relying on
the use of the jurisdictional label in dicta. 108 The last element of the
Court's rationale, therefore, does not apply to analysis of the conciliation requirement. To the extent available from Zipes, Supreme
Court guidance suggests viewing the conciliation prerequisite as substantive rather than jurisdictional.
Even if the conciliation requirement does amount to a jurisdictional prerequisite, the district courts should carefully discriminate
between summary judgment and dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Admittedly, summary judgment would not bar a subsequent suit if
the conciliation requirement is jurisdictional. 109 But the jurisdictional analysis itself denies the trial court the authority to issue such
an order on the merits. 110 The possibility of reversal on appeal does
little to diminish the need to avoid error at trial.
B.

Consideration of Material Outside the Pleadings Under Rule
12(b)

The problematic nature of the jurisdictional analysis suggests the
more straightforward approach of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. Disposition under rule 12(b)(6) offers a more accurate,
if still imperfect, procedural response to inadequate conciliation efforts.111 But rule 12(b) imposes one additional hurdle to dismissal as
distinguished from summary judgment: if the trial court considers
factual material outside the pleadings in resolving the 12(b)(6) motion, it must treat the motion as one for summary judgment under
106. 102 S.Ct. at 1133.
107. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 272 (4th Cir.) (the conciliation provision "has been construed to create an express condition on the commission's
power to sue"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976) (emphasis added); EEOC v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 366 F. Supp. 273, 275 (D. Md. 1973) ("The language of the Act conveys a clear
Congressional intent that a bona fide attempt at conciliation hy the EEOC is a precondition to
its filing suit." (emphasis added)).
108. See 102 S.Ct. at 1133.
109. See Trovillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520, 524 (5th Cir. 1980).
110. "[T]he general rule is that it is improper for a district court to enter a judgment under
Rule 56 for defendant because of a lack of jurisdiction. . . . If the court has no jurisdiction, it
has no power to enter a judgment on the merits and must dismiss the action." 10 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 18 at§ 2713 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
111. Ideally, the Federal Rules should contain a specific provision for a dismissal without
prejudice for failure to satisfy preconditions to suit. Until the Rules include such a provision,
existing procedural devices must be adapted to achieve the most accurate disposition possible
under the current Rules.
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rule 56. 112 Since the Commission's complaint typically includes an
assertion that the claim fulfills all statutory preconditions to suit, a
finding of inadequate conciliation must depend on matters outside
the pleadings. 113 A mechanical application of rule 12(b) would require granting summary judgment in cases where the defendant's affidavits persuade the court that the Commission has not yet met the
conciliation requirement.
But the courts need not interpret the rule so woodenly. Treating a
motion as one for summary judgment may mean no more than that
the standard for granting or denying the motion to dismiss is identical to the standard for granting or denying a motion for summary
judgment. District courts frequently word their orders in such circu~stances as granting a motion to dismiss, treated as a motion for
summary judgment. 114 It follows that the trial court could resolve
the 12(b)(6) motion under the standards set for summary judgment,
and then grant the motion as requested with a specific notation that
the dismissal is without prejudice to the refiling of the complaint after adequate conciliation efforts. 115 Such an approach serves the underlying purposes of the rule without violence to its language, and
provides a procedural device by which to enforce the conciliation
requirement without denying plaintiffs an ultimate adjudication of
the merits. The fundamental purpose of the federal rules, to produce
substantive justice rather than procedural artifice, supports such an
interpretation. 116
112. FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(6).
113. Originally, several courts refused to permit the Commission to plead the conciliation
requirement generally, on the ground that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a
specific pleading of jurisdictional prerequisites. EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 364 F. Supp. 188
(D. Md. 1973); EEOC v. Griffin Wheel, 360 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Ala. 1973); see FED. R. C1v. P.
8(a). This practice ended in 1974 when the Fifth Circuit decided EEOC v. Standard Forge &
Axle Co., 496 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1975). While specifically
refusing to comment on the question ofjurisdiction, the court held that the EEOC could plead
generally that it had fulfilled all conditions precedent to suit. 496 F.2d at 1395; see FED. R.
C1v. P. 9(c). In subsequent cases, the courts have deferred to the "authoritative judicial interpretation" of Standard Forge. EEOC v. United Aircraft Corp., Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div.,
383 F. Supp. 1313, 1315 (D. Conn. 1974); accord, EEOC v. Times-Picayune Publishing Corp.,
500 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); EEOC v. Metropolitan Atlanta Girls' Club, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
114. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. Lehtin, 313 F. Supp. 1324, 1330 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ("defendants' motion to dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment as allowed by Rule 12(b)
Fed. R.Civ.P., should be and is hereby granted under Rule 56(b).").
115. One court, for example, issued an order to the effect that:
respondents' motion to dimiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment, is granted with
prejudice as to [some alle~ations] of petitioner's Petition. Respondent's motion to dismiss
IS granted without prejudice as to [some allegations] of petitioner's Petition. Petitioner is
granted leave to file a new action . . . .
Zeidman v. United States Parole Comm., No. 77 Civ. 4709 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1978).
116. See FED. R. C1v. P. l; Acoustica Assocs. v. Powertron Ultrasonics Corp., 28 F.R.D.
16 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. DuPont Textile Mills, 26 F. Supp. 236
(M.D.Pa. 1939).
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CONCLUSION

Summary judgment based on inadequate conciliation efforts
needlessly obstructs the pursuit of justice on the merits in Title VII
actions. Dismissal without prejudice reflects greater fidelity to the
congressional purpose of combatting employment discrimination,
while satisfying the policy concerns of the courts confronted by premature litigation. Dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted offers the best available disposition of Title VII actions brought prior to the failure of required
conciliation efforts.

